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Disaster Law and Inequality
Daniel A. Farber*

Introduction
Having been a member of the faculty committee that selected
the first editorial board of the Journalof Law and Inequality, I am
particularly pleased at the opportunity to participate in this
Symposium, which commemorates the Journal's twenty-fifth
anniversary. I want to use the occasion to explore a new frontier
for the study of law and inequality: natural disasters.
We often think of disasters as "acts of God" falling like rain
on the rich and poor alike. In terms of property damage, the rich
have much more at stake in natural disasters, though they may
benefit from having less vulnerable buildings and better disaster
response than the less affluent. But in terms of the death, injury,
and physical dislocation, the most vulnerable segments of society
are the ones that suffer the most.
Earthquakes and hurricanes are not, of course, the products
of inequality, yet their impacts can fall very unevenly on different
members of society. 1 This was brought home vividly to anyone
who watched the news during Hurricane Katrina. Consider the
Superdome, which offered shelter of last resort: 'The Dome was a
brewing public health disaster .... The number of people inside
had doubled in twenty-four hours, becoming a virtual city of
2
twenty-thousand, overwhelmingly poor and African American."
For days it was "clear to anyone watching television that the
Sho Sato Professor of Law and Faculty Director, California Center for
Environmental Law and Policy, University of California, Berkeley.
1. For background on this problem, see DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN,
DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 109-60 (2006). As the National
Research Council ("NRC") observes, some "population segments are more likely to
experience casualties, property damage, psychological impacts, demographic
impacts, economic impacts or political impacts-as direct, indirect, or informational
effects." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON DISASTER RESEARCH IN THE SOC.
ScIS., FACING HAZARDS AND DISASTERS: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIMENSIONS 73

(2006). The NRC refers to this phenomenon as "social vulnerability." Id.
2. JOHN MCQUAID & MARK SCHLEIFSTEIN, PATH OF DESTRUCTION: THE
DEVASTATION OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE COMING AGE OF SUPERSTORMS 235 (2006).
The authors are two Times Picayune reporters who covered the disaster firsthand.
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majority of people trapped in New Orleans were African
Americans, most from the low end of the income spectrum." 3 This
is because "much of New Orleans' white population had departed
before the storm hit, while the remainder lived in areas closer to
dry land and found it easier to escape." 4
Ultimately, the
Congressional Research Service found that approximately 272,000
African Americans were displaced by flooding or damage,
compromising seventy-three percent of the people affected by the
5
storm in Orleans parish.
Similar patterns exist for other disasters. A tsunami on
December 26, 2004, killed roughly a quarter of a million people
and displaced another million, primarily in and around Indonesia.
The burden did not fall evenly on all segments of the population.
The poor were the most heavily impacted--often, the most
vulnerable groups have experienced prior discrimination that has
6
left them living in high risk areas.
As the tsunami shows, the relationship between social
7
disadvantage and disaster risk is not limited to the United States;
however, this Article will focus on the domestic aspects of this
relationship. Part I reviews some incidents of discrimination
involving disasters in the past century of American history. Part
II assembles evidence of the disproportionate impact of disasters
based on race, gender, and age. In Part III, several possible legal
responses to this disproportionate impact are explored, centering
on an analogy to environmental justice remedies. Part IV suggests
that this disproportionate impact may best be regarded as a wakeup call about less dramatic but more deeply entrenched social
needs, and Part V offers a brief conclusion.
I. Disaster Inequality in American History
In the early twentieth century, disasters and racial issues
3. MCQUAID & SCHLEIFSTEIN, supra note 2, at 300. Outside the city, in St.
Bernard parish, Whites were more heavily impacted and many died. Id.
4. Id.
5. THOMAS GABE, GENE FALK & MAGGIE MCCARTY, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: HURRICANE KATRINA: SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
IMPACTED AREAS 14, 16-17 (2005).
6. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 1, at 115-16.

7. Although not the focus of this Article, poverty is an independent risk factor.
For example, an international survey found that mortality rates from natural
disasters were closely tied to both a society's general level of economic welfare and
its degree of income inequality. See Matthew E. Kahn, The Death Toll From
Natural Disasters: The Role of Income, Geography, and Institutions, 87 REV. OF
ECON. & STAT. 271 (2005).
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often were intertwined. For example, after the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake, Whites singled out Japanese and Chinese groups for
negative treatment.8 Not only did Whites loot Chinatown after the
residents had evacuated, 9 but they also attempted to move
Chinatown to the least desirable area of the city. They were foiled
by the concerted resistance of the Chinese community. 0
Repressive actions toward Japanese people, including school
segregation, at one point threatened to start a war between the
United States and Japan.1 1 Similarly, after Galveston, Texas was
destroyed by a flood in September of 1900, reports indicated that
an unknown number of African Americans and foreigners were
shot. 'White fears of blacks-fed by racial stereotypes-surfaced
12
and shaped the post-storm recovery."
The Mississippi flood of 1927 provides a classic example of
how disaster and race interact. 13 The area hit hardest by the flood
was the Mississippi Delta, which had a heavily Black population.
On April 21, there was a major break in the levees. 14 Even before
the break, nearby Greenville had begun to prepare by putting
hundreds of Black men to work on reinforcing the city's protective
levee. After the break, the effort was doubled: "All that day police
rounded up hundreds more black men and carried them to the
protection levee" to work. 15 On April 25, plans were made to
evacuate Greenville.16 "white women and children massed around
gangplanks waiting to board the steamboats; the barges would
carry Negroes and terrified livestock."' 7 But plans to evacuate
Blacks were cancelled by planters afraid of losing their

8. See PHILIP L. FRADKIN, THE GREAT EARTHQUAKE AND FIRESTORMS OF 1906,

289-304 (2005).
9. Id. at 292-93.
10. Id. at 295.
11. Id. at 301.
12. Id. at 20.
13. The flood is the subject of John M. Barry's classic book, RISING TIDE: THE
GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND

How

IT CHANGED AMERICA (1998).

For a

useful timeline of the flood, see Public Broadcasting Service, Fatal Flood: Timeline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbbamex/flood/timeline/timeline2.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2007).
14. BARRY, supra note 13, at 201.
15. Id. at 206.
16. Princella W. Nowell, The Flood of 1927 and Its Impact in Greenville,
Mississippi, in

MISSISSIPPI

HISTORICAL

SOCIETY,

MISSISSIPPI

http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/features/feature72/MSFlood.htm
2007) (discussing the effects of the flood on Greenville).
17. BARRY, supra note 13, at 308.

HISTORY

NOW,

(last visited Feb. 15,
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workforce. 18
Blacks and Whites remaining in Greenville lived very
different lives. About 4,000 Whites remained living on second
floors, in offices, and in hotels. 19 In the meantime, about 5,000
Blacks were jammed into warehouses, oil mills, and stores. 20 Over
10,000 more lived on top of the levees in tents, with thousands of
livestock. 21 The "disparity between life for black and white seemed
greater than in normal life." 22 Blacks "felt betrayed."23 A form of
slavery had been reinstated. 24 "The National Guard patrolled the
perimeter of the levee camp with rifles and fixed bayonets. To
enter or leave, one needed a pass. '25 This was true throughout
Mississippi. 26 In the Greenville camp, brutality was commonplace,
27
and Blacks said they were "treated like dogs."
As flooding continued, over 300,000 people, mostly Black,
were relocated to camps for up to four months. 28 During the
cleanup, loading supplies and cleaning was considered work only
18. Id. at 310.
19. Id. at 311.
20. Id. at 312.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The description on the website of the Mississippi Historical Society is more
circumspect:
African-American families were instructed by some community leaders to
stay on the levee to work in flood control and, later, recovery efforts. The
men feared that if they allowed this labor force to leave they might not
return. This decision to not let African- Americans evacuate and to work
them without pay would soon bring an eruption of racial tensions.
The laborers were not paid and resented being threatened that if they did
not participate in the levee repair, or other work such as unloading the
food sent on barges by the Red Cross, that they would not be allowed to
have the food that the Red Cross was handing out. Thus, the people
struggling to live on a sliver of ground above water, became aggravated
about their circumstances.
Their squalid living conditions and work
requirements were first reported through the Associated Negro Press and
by the end of May had spread to the white press.
Nowell, supra note 16. On the other hand, Public Broadcasting Service describes
the situation more starkly in its description of events in April 1927: "Only African
Americans wearing tags around their necks marked 'laborer' receive rations.
National Guard is called in to patrol the refugee camps in Greenville. Word filters
out of the camps that guardsmen are robbing, assaulting, raping and even
murdering African Americans held on the levee." Public Broadcasting Service,
supra note 13.
25. BARRY, supranote 13, at 313.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 315.
28. Id. at 286.
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appropriate for Blacks, who the police conscripted into work
gangs. 29 Leading members of the national Black community were
persuaded to cover up the abuses, in return for promises that the
federal government would help Blacks buy farms later. These
promises were abandoned as soon as Herbert Hoover no longer
needed black support to get the Republican presidential
nomination. 30
Ultimately, as a direct result of the flood
experience, tens of thousands of Blacks left the Delta for Chicago
31
and other northern cities.
A year later, in 1928, a major hurricane hit Florida,
devastating residents near the Everglades. "As the storm barreled
into Lake Okeechobee, some whites managed to scramble into the
region's sturdier homes, packing houses, and hotels, but most
blacks had to ride it out in their unprotected shanties in the lowlying fields." 32 The hurricane killed 2,500 people, "mostly poor
33
blacks who drowned in the vegetable fields of the Everglades."
As in the Mississippi flood, officials conscripted Blacks into the
cleanup effort at gunpoint.3 4 Discrimination did not end with
death: "Coffins were reserved for whites, and the soils of the
Everglades were far too saturated for burials, so 674 black victims
were stacked like cordwood on flatbed trucks and hauled to a mass
35
grave in West Palm Beach."
These incidents may be dismissed as ancient history by some.
Although these graphic forms of discrimination have been largely
eliminated, factors such as race and poverty unfortunately
continue to matter in terms of disaster vulnerability. Disaster
may rain down on all, but it only sprinkles on some, while pouring
on others.
29. Id. at 328.
Again, the Mississippi Historical Society website's
30. Id. at 382-85.
description is more diplomatic:
As word spread about the mistreatment of blacks in the levee camps,
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who served as chairman of a
special committee to coordinate all flood relief efforts, created the Colored
Advisory Committee to look into the allegations and named Robert Moton
After investigations, the
from the Tuskegee Institute to head it.
committee presented a harsh report to Hoover, but he failed to take any
action.
Nowell, supra note 16.
31. BARRY, supra note 13, at 417.
32. MICHAEL GRUNWALD, THE SWAMP: THE EVERGLADES, FLORIDA, AND THE
POLITICS OF PARADISE 192 (2006).
33. Id. at 193.
34. Id. at 194.
35. Id.
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II. Disasters and Vulnerable Groups
The relationship between disasters and societal disadvantage
deserves further study from social scientists. Current research on
the subject is sparse, but what we know at this point is enough to
indicate clearly that race and poverty, along with age and gender,
make a significant difference. Those who already suffer from
societal disadvantage are more likely to be in harm's way, and
they are less likely to be able to take defensive action or to
reconstruct their lives after a disaster.
A. Race and Ethnicity
As we have seen, racial minorities often have been
disproportionately victimized in disasters, as further evidenced by
Hurricane Katrina. 36 The reasons are closely connected to the
general social disadvantages suffered by minority groups. 37 As a
report issued soon after Katrina explained, the disproportionate
impact of the disaster was no coincidence:
Twenty-eight percent of people in New Orleans live in poverty.
Of these, 84 percent are African-American. Twenty-three
percent of people five years and older living in New Orleans
are disabled. An estimated 15,000 to 17,000 men, women, and
children in the New Orleans area are homeless. The lowest
lying areas of New Orleans tend to be populated by those
without economic or political resources. The city's Lower
Ninth Ward, for example, which was especially hard hit and
completely inundated by water, is among its poorest and
lowest lying areas. Ninety-eight percent of its residents are
African-American ....[A]n expert on New Orleans' vulnerable
topography explains: "[I]n New Orleans, water flows away
from money. Those with resources who control where the
drainage goes have always chosen to live on the high ground.
So the people in the low areas were the hardest hit."
Of the households living in poverty, many have no access to a
car: 21,787 of these households without a car are black; 2,606
are white. This lack of access became crucial, given an
evacuation plan premised on the ability
of people to get in
38
their cars and drive out of New Orleans.

36. MEMBER SCHOLARS OF THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE
KATRINA 35 (2005), available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/

UnnaturalDisaster_512.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Center for Progressive Reform also argued that this should have
been foreseen.
It contends that warnings from "[c]ommunity groups and
environmental justice scholars" help demonstrate not only that "government
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More than a third of black New Orleans households lacked
cars, including almost sixty percent of all black households below
39
poverty level.
There was also at least one incident suggestive of more
intentional discrimination. In the aftermath of Katrina, a mostly
Black crowd of New Orleans residents attempted to escape across
the bridge to Gretna, Louisiana. 40 They were turned back by
armed police because the City of Gretna refused to give them
shelter or help them evacuate. 41 Litigation is now under way that
may determine whether this shocking response to the plight of
42
desperate people was racially motivated.
The connection of race and poverty with evacuation rates was
not unique to Katrina. As the NRC found:
[R]esearch has shown that different racial, ethnic, income, and
special needs groups respond in different ways to warning
information and evacuation orders ....For example, members
of some minority groups tend to have large extended families,
making contacting family members and deliberating on
alternative courses of action a more complicated process.
Lower-income groups, inner-city residents, and elderly persons
are more likely to have to rely on public transportation, rather
than personal vehicles, in order to evacuate. Lower-income
and minority populations, who tend to have larger families,
may also be reluctant to impose on friends and relatives for
shelter. Lack of financial resources may leave less-well-off
segments of the population less able to take time off from work
distances to avoid
when disasters threaten, to travel long
43
danger, or to pay for emergency lodging.
In addition, the NRC found members of minority groups may
distrust emergency information provided by the White majority,
and those who rely on non-English speaking media sources may
44
find it more difficult to obtain warnings.
decision makers should have known just who would be left to suffer the harms of
protections foregone, but that they did know .... [Tihe disproportionate impacts
experienced by the poor and black communities from Katrina is part of a pattern of
environmental disasters in which low-income communities and communities of
color are overlooked in the preparations before such disasters occur and receive less
rapid assistance afterwards." Id. at 35-36.
39. See ARLOC SHERMAN & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES,

ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE VICTIMS OF HURRICANE KATRINA 2

(2005), availableat http://www.cbpp.org/9-19-05pov.htm.
5 (2006),
available at
40. PHILIP CLARK,
BRIDGE TO NOWHERE
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/disasters/Clark.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 4-5.
43. NRC, supra note 1, at 129-30.
44. Id. at 130.
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As with other American disasters, immigrants also suffered
disproportionately in the aftermath of Katrina. Undocumented
aliens are eligible for immediate post-emergency services but not
for any long-term shelter or food assistance. 45 They may avoid
obtaining even short-term assistance because of well-founded fears
that they will be detained and deported. 46 Of further concern,
some immigrants who were lawfully in the United States were
ineligible for certain assistance. 47
This category included
individuals on temporary work, student or tourist visas, and also
(ironically) certain refugees from Central American disasters who
had been admitted to the United States for humanitarian
reasons.

4 s

The relationship between race, poverty, and disaster risk can
be complex. Demonstrably, in 1995 over 700 Chicago residents
died in a week-long heat wave. 49 African Americans were the
group most at risk, being one and a half times more likely to die
than Whites. 50 But Hispanics were the least likely of any group to
be victims. 51 Although their "overall level of poverty placed them
at a heightened risk of mortality, [they] experienced a surprisingly
low death rate."52 The reason for the contrast between the African
American and Hispanic risk levels may be related to the social
ecology of the neighborhoods where they live, with Hispanic
neighborhoods being more likely to encourage the elderly to get
out and connect with others. 53 Along with age, social isolation is a
critical risk factor in heat waves.5 4 A sociologist who studied the
heat wave explains why African Americans had the highest death
rate:
They are the only group in the city segregated and ghettoized
in community areas with high levels of abandoned housing
45. BERKELEY INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, WHEN DISASTER STRIKES:

A

HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF THE 2005 GULF COAST HURRICANES 25-26 (2006),
available
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/ihrlc/pdf/disasterstrikes-

version2.pdf.
46. Id. at 26-27.
47. Id. at 28.
48. Id.
49. ERIC KLINENBERG,

HEAT

WAVE: A

SOCIAL AUTOPSY OF DISASTER

IN

CHICAGO 9 (2002).
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id. at 19.
52. Id.

53. Idat 117 ("The commercial life is particularly important to local seniors, for
it not only draws them out when they need goods or services but also gives them an
excuse to leave home when they are feeling lonely or bored.").
54. Id. at 45-46.
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stock, empty lots, depleted commercial infrastructure,
population decline, degraded sidewalks, parks, and streets,
and impoverished institutions. Violent crime and active
street-level drug markets, which are facilitated by these
ecological conditions, exacerbate the difficulties of using public
space 55and organizing effective support networks in such
areas.
More generally, lack of social capital (in the form of a rich
increases
greatly
relationships)
of community
network
vulnerability to risk.56 The. degree of social capital in a community
may be related in complex ways to demographic characteristics,
resulting in uneven and sometimes unexpected correlations
57
between demography and disaster risk.
Race also emerges as a factor during the reconstruction
period following disasters. Minority and poor individuals are less
likely to have insurance that might aid them during
reconstruction. 58 They are less likely to be homeowners and
therefore less likely to benefit from the special assistance available
to owners of residential property. Having faced a shortage of
affordable housing even before a disaster, they may be especially
59
hard-pressed in the aftermath.
B. Gender and Age
The disproportionate suffering of women demonstrates
another disturbing pattein in big disasters. 60 As noted by disaster
researchers, women are more likely to be the front-line caregivers,
thus performing more of the emotional work involved in disaster
Some researchers maintain that women are
recovery. 61
"particularly subject to environmental risks through urban
degradation,
environmental
and
migration,
displacement
The NRC
migration, poverty and other limits to choice." 62
recognizes that being female is a risk factor for experiencing post-

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 127.
See NRC, supra note 1, at 231-33.
See KLINENBERG, supra note 49, at 19.
See FARBER & CHEN, supra note 1, at 129.
Id. at 129-30.

60. See ELAINE ENARSON, GENDER ISSUES IN NATURAL DISASTERS: TALKING

POINTS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 2-3 (2000), http://www.gdnonline.org/resources/ilotalking.doc (discussing the impact of disasters on women).
61. LEE

CLARKE,

WORST

CASES: TERROR

IMAGINATION 134 (2006) (citation omitted).
62. Id.

AND CATASTROPHE

IN POPULAR
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disaster psychological trauma. 63
There are also reports that
disasters exacerbate the difficulties of domestic violence.6 4 As one
sociologist observed:
The finely balanced networks of support poor women develop
to survive in our economy, piecing together cash from odd jobs,
boyfriends, government, family and kin, were ripped apart by
this storm. Low wage women employed at the lowest rungs of
the tourist industry and as beauticians, child care workers,
home health aides, servers and temporary office workers will
not be helped back on their feet by economic recovery plans
geared to major employers in the formal sector ....
Community-wide economic recovery is impossible without the
female labor force, but barriers of all kinds arise in rebuilding
child care systems, especially the family-based care upon
which most American infants and youngsters depend.
Without functioning households and the social infrastructure
of transit systems, schools, stores, health clinics and child
care, women's return to employment is delayed. Women
supporting
households single-handedly are, of course, most at
65
risk.
According to one study by an advocacy group, only one-third
of families headed by women have returned to New Orleans.
Women's incomes have dropped in the city while men's have risen,
and only a handful of federally subsidized daycare centers have
66
reopened.
The relationship between gender and disaster vulnerability is
more complex. In the Chicago heat wave, the majority of the
victims were men.67 Within the same age group, men were more
than twice as likely to die as women. 68 Apparently, elderly men
are more likely to be socially isolated than women of the same age,
69
and hence they are more likely to fall victim to heat waves.

63. NRC, supra note 1, at 155. Being a member of a minority group or being
poor are also risk factors. Id. at 154.
64. See ELAINE ENARSON, FREDA CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN, SURVIVING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND DISASTERS 1-

6 (1998), availableat http://www.harbour.sfu.ca/freda/reports/dviol.htm.
65. Elaine Enarson, WOMEN AND GIRLS LAST? AVERTING THE SECOND POST-

KATRINA DISASTER 2 (2005), http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Enarson/.
66. See Press Release, Women's Funding Network, Study Shows that Women,
Disproportionately Affected by Katrina, Also Hold Keys to Rebuilding (Aug. 27,
2006), available at http://www.wfnet.org/documents/press_releases/WFNMFW
Katrinarelease-aug_27.pdf (noting that men's median annual income rose to
$43,055, women's fell to $28,932, and only ten childcare centers have reopened).
67. See KLINENBERG, supra note 49, at 19-20 ("Fifty-five percent of the heatrelated deaths were men . .
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id. at 74-75.
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Age is also an important factor in disaster vulnerability, as
children suffer from special vulnerabilities. 70 As one disaster
expert observes, if "children are not recognized as a special
population and planned for accordingly, they can be at grave and
disproportionately higher risk in major disasters."71 Children also
may suffer special forms of injury, such as separation from parents
or interruptions in education. About a fourth of the population in
areas impacted by Katrina were children-183,000 children were
displaced by the storm. 72 Thirty percent of the children in these
areas lived in poverty. 73 Furthermore, children may be at special
74
risk of exploitation during disasters.
The elderly also are exposed to heightened risks. In the 1995
Chicago heat wave, almost three quarters of the victims were over
sixty-five. 75 The elderly are at higher risk from hurricanes:
Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard's story of a
Kenner City employee's elderly mother calling her son from a
nursing home in the first four days and eventually succumbing
to the rising water was played out repeatedly in other nursing
homes where the oldest old remained due to frailty and poor
health. During the evacuation for Hurricane Ivan in 2004
most deaths occurred among the elderly who were unable to
bear the heat and stress of getting caught in the day-long
traffic jams arising from a poorly planned evacuation strategy.
During Hurricane Katrina the elderly and disabled died in the
Convention Center and in their homes throughout the city of
the symptoms of diseases such as asthma, diabetes, and high
blood pressure that are easily managed under normal
lethal when access to medicine and
conditions but that become
76
treatment is cut off.
Nearly half of the elderly living in the Katrina impact zone

70. See IRWIN REDLENER, AMERICANS AT RISK: WHY WE ARE NOT PREPARED FOR
MEGADISASTERS AND WHAT WE CAN Do Now 103-27 (2006) (noting some factors

why children face particular challenges, such as size, maturity, ability to
comprehend the gravity of the situation, and noting that children have been
mentioned as specific targets of terror attacks).
71. Id. at 105. Dr. Redlener is the director of the National Center for Disaster
Preparedness at Columbia University. Id. at 275.
72. See GABE, FALK & MCCARTY, supra note 6, at 18.
73. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 2, at 139.
74. See STEPHANIE DELANEY, ECPAT INTERNATIONAL, PROTECTING CHILDREN
FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION & SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN DISASTER & EMERGENCY

SITUATIONS 21-22 (2006), available at http://www.ecpat.net/eng/pdf/ProtectingChildren-fromCSECjin Disaster.pdf.
75. KLINENBERG, supra note 50, at 18-19 (seventy-three percent).
76. ELIZABETH FUSSELL, LEAVING NEW ORLEANS: SOCIAL STRATIFICATION,
NETWORKS,

AND

HURRICANE

EVACUATION,

http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/ Fussell/.

June

11,

2006,
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reported having at least one disability, and a quarter reported that
their disability impaired their ability to leave their dwellings
unassisted.7 7 Not surprisingly, over forty percent of the dead were
78
identified as over seventy years old.
Given the unequal impact of disaster, disaster law has a
significant intersection with discrimination law. Moreover, the
form of discriminatory impact involved in disasters poses special
challenges in terms of legal remedies. I consider these issues in
the next section.
III. Potential Legal Responses to Disaster Inequality
In considering possible legal remedies for disaster inequality,
there are two of models that might provide guidance. The first
derives from the efforts of the environmental justice movement to
identify remedies for environmental harms (mostly exposure to
toxic chemicals) that fall particularly on minority and poor
communities.
The second model focuses on the issue of
compensation for victims of natural disasters such as Hurricane
Katrina. A potential blueprint for the latter model is the fund
established to compensate victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
while the former is similar to the continuing effort to obtain
reparations for slavery and racial discrimination. Apart from the
9/11 fund, these models have not met with much success, but they
do provide some analogies that may be helpful in seeking remedies
for disaster inequality.
A. EnvironmentalJustice as a Model
Disaster inequality has much in common with the issue of
environmental justice. Indeed, it could be considered a special
form of environmental injustice. It has proved difficult to find
appropriate legal tools for addressing environmental justice issues,
and disaster inequality poses similar challenges. Participation by
members of minority groups in decisions affecting disaster
planning has been limited in the same way as their participation
in environmental decisions. As one leading environmental law
scholar has explained:
Minority interests have traditionally had little voice in the
various points of influence that strike the distributional
balances necessary to get environmental protection laws

77. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 2, at 139.
78. National Public Radio, Katrina Took Deadly Toll on Elderly (Mar. 5, 2006).
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enacted, regulations promulgated, and enforcement actions
initiated.
The interest groups historically active in the
environmental protection area include a variety of mainstream
environmental organizations representing a spectrum of
interests
(conservation,
recreation,
hunting,
wildlife
protection, resource protection, human health), as well as a
variety of commercial and industrial concerns. Until very
recently, if at all, the implications for racial minorities of
environmental protection laws have not
been a focal point of
79
concern for any of these organizations.
In this section, I consider several possibilities for improved
legal remedies in the context of disaster law. Environmental
justice provides an instructive model-unfortunately, this is
especially true in terms of approaches that have proved
unproductive and should not be followed.
1. Liability
Existing law presents significant barriers to recovering from
government actions that result in disproportionate harm to
vulnerable populations from natural disasters. Environmental
justice advocates have hit something of a dead end in their efforts
to find a legal remedy for similar kinds of harm resulting from
exposure to toxic substances.8 0 They saw Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act as one of their most promising weapons.8 1 Title VI
prohibits discrimination by recipients of federal funds.
The
regulations under Title VI cover both intentional discrimination
82
and actions having a disparate impact on minority groups;
however, viability of private actions to enforce the Title VI
regulations currently is unclear.8 3 In Alexander v. Sandoval,8 4 the
Court held that the Title VI regulations do not create a private

79. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice':"The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REv. 787, 812 (1993).
80. See Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action Under EPA's Title
VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6-12 (1999) (describing the weaknesses of the Equal
Protection Clause and the common law as legal tools to address environmental
inequities).
81. See id. at 12 (noting that advocates have turned from Equal Protection
Clause arguments to Title VI due to the availability of an unjustified disparate
impact claim).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 4 ("[It is unclear whether these agency regulations, based on
Section 602 of Title VI, create a private right of action allowing plaintiffs to sue in
federal courts.").
84. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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cause of action. s5 In dissent, Justice Stevens skeptically suggested
that the decision had limited practical effect:
[T]o the extent that the majority denies relief to the
respondents merely because they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C. §
1983 in framing their Title VI claim, this case is something of a
sport. Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the Title VI
regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only
86
reference § 1983 to obtain relief.
Soon afterwards, however, a federal appeals court rejected
87
this theory.
Another potential source of remedy for discriminatory
disaster relief might be section 311 of the Stafford Act, which
provides as follows:
(a) The President shall issue, and may alter and amend, such
regulations as may be necessary for the guidance of personnel
carrying out Federal assistance functions at the site of a major
disaster or emergency. Such regulations shall include
provisions for insuring that the distribution of supplies, the
processing of applications, and other relief and assistance
activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial
manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color,
religion, nationality, sex, age, or economic status.
(b) As a condition of participation in the distribution of
assistance or supplies under this Act or of receiving assistance
under this Act, governmental bodies and other organizations
shall be required to comply with regulations relating to
nondiscrimination promulgated by the President, and such
other regulations applicable to activities within an area
affected by a major disaster or emergency as he88 deems
necessary for the effective coordination of relief efforts.
For this provision to become an effective remedy, a court
would have to find that it gives rise to an implied cause of action
or that violations of section 311 are actionable under 42 U.S.C. §
85. See id. at 293 ("Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does
Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce
regulations promulgated under § 602. We therefore hold that no such private right
exists.").
86. Id. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d
771, 778-79 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that Supreme Court precedent regarding
Section 1983 would not permit the route Justice Stevens suggests); see also Save
Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[B]ecause of
controlling Supreme Court precedent, we hold that an agency regulation cannot
create individual rights enforceable through § 1983.").
88. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Disaster
Relief Act of 1974), Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 311, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 5151 (2006)).
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1983. The barriers encountered in enforcing non-intentional
violations of Title VI seem to be equally problematic here, but the
matter certainly deserves further exploration. In any event, the
civil rights community should exert pressure on the President for
an expansive definition of discrimination under the implementing
regulations of section 311.
Constitutional causes of action also face formidable
barriers.8 9 Disparate impact on minorities or women is not enough
to state an equal protection claim; there must be evidence that the
government intended to target these groups. 90 Moreover, other
vulnerable groups, such as children, the elderly, and the disabled,
receive little constitutional protection even from intentional
government discrimination. 91 Further, the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment applies only to situations in
which the government intends to impose punishment. 92 Lastly,
claims for deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process are blocked because the government has no constitutional
duty to prevent disasters or to provide disaster assistance. 93 Thus,
the chances for successful constitutional litigation appear slim
under current law.
2. Requirements for Administrative Consideration
Efforts also have been made to inject environmental justice
into the administrative process. In 1994, President Clinton signed
Executive
Order
12,898,
Federal Actions
to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations. 94 The order provided that each federal agency "shall
make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately
89. For a more detailed discussion, see FARBER & CHEN, supra note 1, at 12324.
90. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a law in spite of
its racially disproportionate impact due to a lack of racially discriminatory
purpose).
91. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985) (applying only rational basis review to strike down a law requiring a special
use permit for a group home for mentally retarded persons).
92. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (describing the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause as primarily limiting the method and proportionality of
punishment, and only rarely limiting what may be criminalized).
93. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989) (noting that the Due Process Clause "cannot fairly be extended to impose an
affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that [interests in life, liberty and
property] do not come to harm through other means").
94. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
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high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and lowincome populations in the United States and its territories and
possessions." 95
The Administrator of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was directed to convene
an interagency Federal Working Group on Environmental Justice
to assist each agency in developing an agency-wide environmental
96
justice strategy.
In 1995, the EPA issued its environmental justice strategy:
[The strategy] is based on the principle that communities
affected by decisions with environmental impacts should be
actively involved in the decisionmaking process. To achieve
this objective, the strategy calls for EPA to increase
coordination with affected communities, state, tribal, and local
governments, business, and various nongovernmental
organizations .... To develop local knowledge bases necessary
for effective participation in complex decisionmaking, EPA will
promote technical assistance programs and grants for minority
and low-income areas.
Under the strategy, EPA will focus enforcement activities on
minority and low-income areas 97suffering disproportionate
environmental and health impacts.
Pursuant to Executive Order 12,898 and Title VI, the EPA
has begun to include environmental justice as a factor in its review
of state permits under federally delegated programs pursuant to
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act. 98 Further, environmental justice
advocates aim to provide opportunities for disadvantaged groups
to participate in the decisionmaking process in a meaningful
99
way.
In any event, the EPA so far has not pursued environmental
justice issues with much enthusiasm. According to a 2003 survey
of the 143 Title VI complaints received by EPA since 1993, 82 were

95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. For further information about the EPA's response to the executive order,
see Denis Binder, et al., A Survey of FederalAgency Response to President Clinton's
Executive Order No. 12898 on Environmental Justice, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11133
(2001).
99. Some possible approaches are discussed in Alejandro Esteban Camacho,

Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality,
Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2005); Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved
Collaboration,26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459 (2002).
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rejected without investigation, 26 were accepted for investigation,
and the remaining 29 were still pending as of November 21,
2003.100 Although the recourse through EPA's Title VI authority
has "yielded collateral benefits," the complaints filed with the EPA
have been "uniformly unsuccessful."' 101
In terms of potential disaster, simple disclosure requirements
might be easy to implement and effective in highlighting
inequality issues. When hazard maps such as FEMA flood maps
(showing 100-year flood zones) are published, they should be
accompanied by maps showing demographics within the risk area.
In federal projects with disaster implications, such as levee
construction, environmental impact statements should make
similar information available.
After disasters, collection of statistics about victims on the
basis of race, gender, income, and age should be required, and the
statistics should be made immediately available. After all, cable
television news may not make these events as obvious in every
disaster as in Katrina. It is important to go beyond the immediate
body count of the disaster and include mortality and illness among
the affected population in the aftermath.
Where legal remedies are ineffective, civil rights groups and
congressional overseers should take it upon themselves to monitor
administrative compliance with Title VI and with section 311 of
the Stafford Act. Moreover, local communities also should see
disaster risks as relevant to them. Though disaster risks usually
are not as immediate and pressing as other problems of low10 2
income communities, in the end they may be even deadlier.
Disasters additionally have the potential to create coalitions with
less disadvantaged communities that also may be at risk. 0 3
Although disasters hit disadvantaged groups particularly hard,
they cause serious damage to other groupsl04-thus, there is
common ground for action that cuts across various segments of
society.
B. Reparationsand Compensation Models
The environmental justice movement has not met with
100. Michael B. Gerrard, EPA Dismissal of Civil Rights Complaints, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 28, 2003, at 3.
101. Id.
102. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 1, at 109-17.
103. Id. at 273-88.
104. Id. at 109-12.
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particular legal success. 105 Similarly, as we will see, efforts to
obtain reparations for African Americans have been stymied to a
large extent. 0 6 The lesson may be that the unequal impact of
disasters should not be directly tied to the remedy but instead
should be used as an argument for compensating all victims of
catastrophes such as Katrina. The 9/11 victims' compensation
fund shows that, at least under some circumstances, compensation
0 7
may have enough political traction to prompt legislation.
1. Legislative Reparations
The debate over reparations offers another perspective on
disaster inequality.
Reparations can take the form of an
administrative compensation scheme of the kind discussed
above. 0 8 But legislative reparations also can take the form of a
lump-sum payment to the injured group or of remedial measures
attempting to redress the effects of disadvantage. 0 9 For instance,
in lieu of payments to individuals, Congress might make a special
investment to improve housing and employment in minority areas
of New Orleans.
The topic of reparations has been discussed extensively in the
context of claims for by the descendants of American slaves. The
reparations issue has given rise to vigorous scholarly debate." 0
Some of the debate concerns the application of private law theories
of liability in this setting;"' however, more attention has been
given to broader policy issues. The argument for reparations is at
heart a simple one. We recognize today that slavery was one of
the great crimes of history, followed by a long and shameful legacy
of legalized discrimination. These wrongs have never been fully
acknowledged-not even in the form of an explicit apology-nor
has recompense been made. This legacy, reparations advocates
say, must be confronted and overcome if the current problems of
105. See supra Part III.A.
106. See infra Part III.B.1.
107. See infra Part III.B.2.
108. See supra Part III.A.2.
109. Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1198-1201 (2004).
110. For a sampling of viewpoints, see id.; Hanoch Dagan et al., The
Jurisprudenceof Slavery Reparations,84 B.U. L. REV. 1135 (2004).
111. Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV.
1177 (2004); Michelle E. Lyons, World Conference Against Racism: New Avenues for
Slavery Reparations?, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1235 (2002); Calvin Massey,
Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparationsfor Slavery, 24 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 157 (2004).

20071

DisasterLaw and Inequality

African Americans are to be addressed seriously.1 12
Opponents of reparations do not question the injustice of
slavery and Jim Crow laws, only whether reparations are a
sensible response.
They see reparations as deeply divisive,
increasing rather than healing racial divisions. 113 Opponents also
fear that the quest for reparations will discourage Blacks from
assuming responsibility for their own futures. 114 Critics further
raise a host of questions about how to calculate the damages for
this past misconduct and to distribute those damages to current
115
generations of African Americans.
Reparations have not yet gained widespread support, which
may not be a promising sign for disaster compensation. As Saul
Levmore puts it, "African American reparations are unlikely to
materialize, and are perhaps as unlikely as a renegotiation with
current American Indians regarding the purchase of Manhattan
Island long ago or as a recovery from present Southerners for the
firing on Fort Sumter. 116 Indeed, public opinion polls show that
only four percent of Whites support compensation for slavery in
contrast to the sixty-seven percent of Blacks who support such
17
payments.
Nevertheless, there are some promising precedents for
reparations. For instance, Florida paid survivors of the 1923
Rosewood massacre $150,000 each, and the State made
substantial payments to the descendants of other victims.

118

Also,

as early as 1946, the United States paid roughly $800 million to
Native Americans for wrongfully seized land and, more recently,
$1.65 billion to wrongfully interned Japanese Americans. 119 The
112. Some of the key arguments for reparations are made in ROY L. BROOKS,
ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 119-63

(2004); Anthony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian
Defense of Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959 (2000); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past:New Efforts in ReparationsDebate in America, 38
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.279 (2003).
113. See Epstein, supra note 111, at 1192; Massey, supra note 111, at 169.
114. See Massey, supra note 111, at 170-71.
115. See Brophy, supra note 109, at 1201-11; Epstein, supra note 111, at 118586; Massey, supra note 111, at 161-62.
116. Saul Levmore, PrivatizingReparations,84 B.U. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2004).
117. Brophy, supra note 109, at 1184. Another poll shows the level of white
support to be somewhat higher at eleven percent. See Levmore, supra note 116, at
1293 n.10.
118. Chad W. Bryan, Precedent for Reparations?A Look at HistoricalMovements
for Redress and Where Awarding Reparationsfor Slavery Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REV.
599, 603-604 (2003).
119. Levmore, supra note 116, at 1303 n.50 (citing Eric A. Posner & Adrian
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federal government paid $9 million to African Americans who
were denied treatment for syphilis as part of the infamous
Tuskegee experiments.' 20 In another gesture of political support,
California passed a statute requiring insurance companies to
submit records of slaveholder insurance policies to a central
registry. 121 More recently, J.P. Morgan Chase apologized for its
predecessors' acceptance of slaves as collateral and in some cases
as payment for debt. The apology was accompanied by a $5
million pledge for black college students from Louisiana. 122 Thus,
at least a glimmer of hope may exist for public support of some
123
kind of slavery reparations program.
The case for compensating Katrina victims should be much
less controversial than the case for compensating descendants of
slaves. There is a powerful argument for providing reparations to
the families of those killed in New Orleans during Katrina.
Unlike slavery, the New Orleans disaster is recent history. We do
not need to worry about tracing the descendants of a generation
long-gone, nor do we need to worry about whether the harm has
been attenuated from the passage of time and occurrence of
intervening events. Moreover, much of the responsibility for the
deaths rests on the federal government for defective design of the
levee system and a botched rescue effort. 24 If they were able to
circumvent the federal government's broad immunity to suit for
flood damage, the survivors would have a plausible negligence
action against the government. Regardless of legal immunity, the
federal government has a moral responsibility to provide
compensation.
If this compensation is not provided in the form of a 9/11-like
victims'
compensation
fund, 125
alternative
models
for
Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 689, 696-98 (2003)).
120. Id. ("African Americans... were denied treatment for syphilis as part of a
government-sponsored experiment begun in 1930's.").
121. Lyons, supra note 111, at 1264.
122. See Moushumi Anand & Robert Mentzer, Federal Judges Hear Arguments
in Reparations Case, CHI. DEFENDER, Sept. 28, 2006.
123. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 112, at 280-81 (citing an Oklahoma statute
and a Chicago city ordinance).
Moreover, Congress waived the statute of
limitations for suits involving discrimination by the Department of Agriculture
against black farmers in the South. See id. at 303.
124. See U.S. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV'T AFFAIRS, HURRICANE
KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. Docs. No.'s 1-1 & 2-1 (2006) reprinted in

FARBER & CHEN, supra note 1, at 5-17 (hereafter "COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY
& GOV'T AFFAIRS").

125. See infra Part III.B.2.
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compensation should be considered. For example, the families of
these victims might be given extra assistance in reconstruction or
relocation. Their children might be given special educational
assistance. Alternatively, the reparation rationale might help
justify expanded assistance to the affected communities as a
whole.
At the very least it would seem the United States
government owes the families of these victims the courtesy of an
official apology. Surely that is the very least our government can
do when it promises protection to its citizens and fails indefensibly
to deliver on that promise.
2. The 9/11 Compensation Fund as a Model
As was proved in the aftermath of our country's worst
terrorist event, compensation need not take place through
litigation.
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack,
126
Congress established a special victims' compensation fund.
Compensation is limited to individuals who were present at the
crash site and who suffered physical injury or death. 127 The
statute covers economic losses "to the extent recovery for such loss
is allowed under applicable State law" including medical expenses,
loss of earnings, and "loss of business or employment
opportunities."'128 It also covers non-economic recovery for physical
and emotional pain.1 29 As an alternative to the fund, victims can
utilize the tort system; however, tort recoveries are limited by the
130
insurance coverage of the airline defendants.
131
To administer the fund, a special master was appointed.
The special master issued regulations to govern claims, and in
some instances the regulations seem to go beyond the statutory
language. 132 The regulations include the following: reducing the

126. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
§ 403, 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 40101). For an overview of
the scheme, see Robert L. Rabin and Suzanne A. Bratis, Financial Compensation
for Catastrophic Loss in the United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR
VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 303 (Michael Faure & Ton

Hartlief eds., 2006). See Elizabeth Berkowitz, The ProblematicRole of the Special
Master: Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, 24 YALE L. & POLY REV. 1 (2006), for criticism of the 9/11 compensation
scheme.
127. § 405(c)(2)(A).
128. § 402(5).
129. § 402(7).
130. § 408(a).
131. § 404(a).
132. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg.
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offset for life insurance and pension benefits to the extent of the
individuals' policy payments or pension contributions; 133 setting an
approximate $250,000 floor on recoveries; 3 4 establishing a
presumptive schedule covering economic loss based on age, family
size, and recent earnings; 135 and creating a schedule for noneconomic losses, with $250,000 to each victim and $100,000 each
to close relatives. 36 Apparently, the special master's strategy was
to "closely enough approximate the range of tort compensation to
make no-fault benefits under the Fund an offer that could not be
refused by most eligible parties."' 37 As it turned out, ninety-seven
38
percent of the victims' families applied to the fund.
So far there has been little political support for a similar
compensation scheme for Katrina victims although the 2006 shift
in control of Congress may make a difference. Many people
perished as a direct result of inadequate levee design or
construction by the federal government and this was compounded
39
by FEMA's shockingly disorganized response to the flooding.
One argument against compensation might be that individuals
were partly responsible for their fates because they failed to
evacuate. 140 Given the evacuation barriers facing many victims,
the assignment of blame to individuals is problematic. In some
cases victims were disabled or unable to evacuate for other
reasons. It is best to consider the issue on an individualized basis.
Even if some fault was assigned to the victims, a comparative fault
scheme such as that used in tort law should be used to adjust
recoveries.
Other factors also may be responsible for the lack of political
interest in a compensation fund scheme. First, the families of 9/11
victims were in a much better position to seek redress as many
were well-educated, affluent, and capable of mustering political
11,233
133.
134.
135.

(Mar. 13, 2002) (codified as 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
Id. at 11,239.
Id. at 11,235.
Id. at 11,237 ("It will be very rare that a claimant will receive less than

$250,000....").
136. Id. at 11,239.
137. Rabin & Bratis, supra note 126, at 341.
138. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 80,

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final-report.pdf.
139. See COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV'T AFFAIRS, supra note 124, at 5-17.
140. See e.g., Steve Esack, Lafayette College Symposium Faults Leadership After
Katrina; But Experts Also Blame People of New Orleans for Not Evacuating,
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL (Pa.) Nov. 20, 2005, at B2.
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clout.1 4 1 Second, perhaps there was a sense that the 9/11 victims,
having suffered due to a foreign attack, were in some sense killed
because of their citizenship. This reasoning presents the victims
as representatives of the broader public, similar to soldiers. Third,
the 9/11 victims had a reasonable prospect of collecting massive
tort damages against the airline industry, giving them political
leverage, whereas the culprits in Katrina seemingly were
In any event, the absence of
immunized by federal law.
compensation to Katrina victims seems particularly unjust
especially when considering both the federal government's role in
causing the flooding and botching the recovery, as well as the
greater disadvantaged status of Katrina victims as compared with

many of those who died in 9/11.142
IV. The Exceptional as a Lens for the Ordinary
The disadvantaged suffer the most during natural disasters.
The reason is not necessarily deliberate or even subconscious
discrimination during the disaster itself, although these may be
factors. More fundamentally, ordinary disadvantages can become
dramatic threats to life and well-being during disasters.
Consider the elderly who died during the Chicago heat
144
wave. 143 They were predominantly poor and socially isolated.
Even on normal days, their apartments often were sweltering, and
they were afraid or unable to leave due to disabilities. 145 They
lived vicariously through their televisions, with little contact with
other human beings. These were often lives of misery that
apparently did not concern society in the least. Only when a heat
wave converted miserable lives into miserable deaths did society
take notice.1 46 Should we not begin to worry about the lives of
these fellow citizens before they fall prey to unusual weather
events?
In the same vein, consider the poor, minority citizens of New
Orleans who fell victim to Katrina. 47 Seeing their faces on CNN
elicited an immediate response, as did the spectacle of their bodies

141.
142.
17.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See Feinberg, supra note 138, at 52-56.
See id.; COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV'T AFFAIRS, supra note 124, at 5See KLINENBERG, supra note 49, at 18-19.
See id.
See id.
See id.
CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 36, at 34-35.
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propped by buildings or floating in the streets. But before the
media attention, society seemed unconcerned about the poverty,
crime, unemployment, and poor health care to which these same
citizens were exposed.
Social disadvantage can kill in very obvious ways during a
disaster. It can kill in less obvious but probably more frequent
ways on any normal day through crime, malnutrition, and poor
health care. Disasters operate as a kind of lens, allowing society
to perceive what was before its eyes all along. The best way to
prevent social disadvantage from becoming deadly during
disasters is to eliminate the disadvantage, rather than merely
focusing on the disaster situation.
Thus, natural disasters can offer society a pedagogical
moment by making what is normally an invisible state of
deprivation suddenly visible and salient. In the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, even President George W. Bush was moved to
reflect on the nature of disadvantage in our society. He observed
that the poverty of so many in the region "has roots in a history of
racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the
opportunity of America."' 148 He added, "[w]e have a duty to
confront this poverty with bold action."'149 Alas, bold actions were
not forthcoming, but at the very least the President's recognition
offered a moment where such change was imaginable. In a
different political setting, Katrina might have sparked some
genuine social change.
Conclusion
Part of what we need for dealing with the extraordinary and
its impact on the disadvantaged is just ordinary good sense. It is a
truism that mobile homes are storm magnets. These are not
dwellings of the affluent. Often they are housing for the poor, and
the regulatory standards are weak. Until 1996, for example, it
was said that a "monkey could have put in your tie-downs" since
Florida had no regulatory program at all. 150 Yet, in the 1990s, the

148. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Pledges Federal Role in Rebuilding Gulf Coast,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A19.
149. Id.
150. See Mary Shanklin and Sean Holton, Old Ties are Rusty, Loose or Missing;
The Straps That Hold Down Mobile Homes are Insufficient on Almost All 1970sand '80s-Era Models That Have Been Examined, ORLANDO STAFF, May 31, 1998, at
A16; see also TED STEINBERG, AcTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF NATURAL

DISASTER IN AMERICA 207 (2d ed. 2000).
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federal oversight program was weakened. 15 1 It has been known
since the 1960s that mobile homes are vulnerable to wind-a
report on the 1965 Hurricane Betsy found that sixty-mile per hour
winds were enough to destroy them. 152 In Florida, mobile homes
remain "wildly popular" among the poor and elderly. 153 It is only a
matter of time until some major metropolitan area in Florida takes
a direct hit from a category four or five hurricane. A little common
sense is all that seems to be required: stringent tie-down
regulations and rigorous enforcement are necessary.
Also as a matter of common sense, many disaster prevention
everyone
in
measures
benefit
and
response
society--disadvantaged or not. Even though Hurricane Katrina
had a disproportionate impact on people who were Black, elderly,
or poor, being young, White, or affluent certainly was no magic
shield. The same levees that protect the affluent and politically
powerful can also protect the poor and politically weak. The
disproportionate harm suffered by those already disadvantaged
provides special reasons for concern about their plight in disasters.
There are several possible responses that the legal system
could choose to address this disproportionate impact, including
administrative disclosure requirements, liability for actions having
disproportionate impact, administrative compensation funds, and
reparations legislation. Perhaps the first fundamental lesson of
disasters is that the social disadvantages our society treats as
ordinary and unremarkable become deadly in dramatic ways
during the course of a disaster. We ought to try to prevent the
conversion of these social disadvantages into post-disaster
mortality figures. The second primary lesson we should take is
that ordinary social disadvantages create their own forms of longterm, low-visibility disasters. Natural disasters may turn lives of
quiet desperation into very visible deaths. We should not wait for
natural disasters to take place before we address the social
disasters that they expose.

151. STEINBERG, supra note 151, at 107.

152. Id. at 90-91.
153. Id. at 92.

